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THE COST OF EDUCATION AS A DEDUCTIBLE
BUSINESS EXPENSE: A
REASSESSMENT
The Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction from gross income
for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business."1 It permits no
deduction for personal living expenses,2 nor immediate deductions for
capital expenditures. 3 Capital expenditures are usually distinguished
from current "ordinary and necessary" expenses by examining the
length of time over which the taxpayer benefits from the expenditure.4
Expenses benefiting a single period are charged to that period as cur-
rent expenses; expenses benefiting a number of periods normally are
capitalized, and the cost is amortized over the periods benefited. 5
The treatment of expenditures for education as ordinary and nec-
essary business expenses has been one of the most litigated 6 and con-
fused issues in the area of business deductions. Since 1950, when Hill v.
Commissioner7 allowed for the first time a business deduction for edu-
cational expenses, litigants as well as scholars have disputed the classi-
fication of the cost of education as personal expenses, capital
expenditures, or current business expenses-and the tax treatment ap-
propriate to each category.
Treasury Regulation section 1.162-58 currently governs the tax
treatment of educational expenses. The section allows a deduction for
the cost of education which "[m]aintains or improves skills required by
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX (1976), hereinafter cited as R. GOODE.
McNulty, Tax Policy and Tuition Credit Legislation" Federal Income Tax Allowancesfor Per-
sonal Costs of Higher Education, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1973), hereinafter cited as McNulty.
1. I.R.C. § 162.
2. Id. § 262.
3. Id. § 263.
4. S. DAVIDSON, C. STICKNEY, & R. WEIL, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 322-28 (1979).
5. See I.R.C. §§ 167, 263. This procedure is in accordance with the matching principle in
accounting: net income is properly measured by charging expenses against the income that those
expenses aid in producing.
6. Samuels & Samuels, Current climatefor deducting education expenses is quitefavorable, 11
TAX. FOR ACCOUNTANTS 226, 226 (1973).
7. 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1967).
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the [taxpayer] in his employment,"9 provided that the education does
not constitute the minimum educational requirement of the taxpayer's
trade or lead to qualifying the taxpayer in a new trade.' 0 Educational
costs excluded by the latter two criteria are deemed "inseparable aggre-
gate[s] of personal and capital expenditures"" that may not be de-
ducted currently, or capitalized and amortized over the periods
benefited by the expense. They are, in short, completely nondeductible.
The current regulation is deficient from both a practical and a the-
oretical viewpoint. Its excessively broad view of what constitutes a new
trade operates to deny deductions when in fairness they should be al-
lowed. Moreover, denying deductions for educational expenses that
"lead to" a new trade or business ignores whether the taxpayer actually
uses the education in a new trade or business. Most important, how-
ever, the regulation is theoretically unsound in both its definition and
its treatment of capital educational expenditures. The regulation incor-
rectly defines a capital expenditure as one which satisfies minimum ed-
ucational requirements of the taxpayer's trade or leads to qualifying the
taxpayer for a new trade, rather than as an expenditure which benefits
more than one period. Furthermore, expenditures deemed capital are
forever nondeductible, because amortization of educational expenses is
not allowed.
Eliminating the "lead to qualifying for a new trade" element of the
current regulation would cure some of the regulation's excessive strict-
ness. This solution, however, still falls short of a theoretically proper
treatment of the cost of education by failing to provide for the capitali-
zation and amortization of business-related educational expenses. This
Comment discusses the history and development of the tax treatment of
educational expenses and urges that the current regulation be rejected
in favor of a capitalization and amortization approach.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Early Cases.
The principle that an individual may not deduct the cost of educa-
tion was well established in the early days of the personal income tax.
Cases and Internal Revenue decisions during the 1920s premised the
denial on the personal character of educational expenses.' 2 In Welch v.
9. Id. § 1.162-5(a)(1).
10. Id. § 1.162-5(b).
11. Id.
12. See Driscoll v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A. 1008 (1926); Darling v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A.
499 (1926); O.D. 984, 5 C.B. 171 (1921); O.D. 892, 4 C.B. 209 (1921). The Board of Tax Appeals
did allow a deduction for the expenses a chemistry professor incurred in attending conventions, in
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Helvering,13 Mr. Justice Cardozo suggested in dictum a separate justifi-
cation for denying deductibility for educational expenses: that the cost
of education is a capital expenditure.14 Welch, however, actually de-
nied the deduction on the ground that the expense was personal be-
cause there was no business custom involved in incurring the expense. 15
The holding in Welch has unfortunately confused the subsequent
discussion of whether expenditures for education are properly deducti-
ble as ordinary business expenses. Because of Welch, the Commis-
sioner16 and a number of courts17 and commentators18 have classified
educational costs as personal expenses unrelated to business. Courts
have made this classification in some cases even though the education
clearly related to the taxpayer's business activity. 19 Critics, however,
relying on Cardozo's dictum,20 have argued that the relevant distinc-
tion is not between personal and business expenses but rather between
capital and current expenditures. 2'
The classification issue was not crucial during the first four de-
cades of the personal income tax, when the Service and the courts con-
sidered all educational costs nondeductible. The distinction became
important in later years, however, once deductions were first allowed
for some educational expenses. An expenditure may be of either a per-
sonal or a business nature and, if business, either current or capital. To
be deductible, however, an educational expense must be neither per-
sonal nor capital. These distinctions are the foundation upon which
Silverman v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1328 (1927). Silverman, however, appears to have been
based not on the educational value of the convention but on the convention's role as a place to
advance the interests of the taxpayer's employer and keep in touch with other scientists. The case
came to stand for the proposition that conventions give rise to deductible ordinary and necessary
business expenses rather than for the notion that the cost of education is deductible. See Coffey v.
Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 1242, 1244 (1931); Jack v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 726, 728 (1928).
13. 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
14. "Reputation and learning are akin to capital assets, like the good will of an old partner-
ship.. . . The money spent in acquiring them is well and wisely spent. It is not an ordinary
expense of the operation of a business." Id. at 115-16.
15. Id. at 114-15.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Michaelson, 313 F.2d 668, 670 (9th Cir. 1963) (citing T.D. 6281,
1958-1 C.B. 63, 67-68); O.D. 984, 5 C.B. 171 (1921); O.D. 892, 4 C.B. 209 (1921).
17. See, e.g., Adelson v. United States, 342 F.2d 332, 336 (9th Cir. 1965); Sharon v. Commis-
sioner, 66 T.C. 515, 525 (1976), aft'd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), ceri. denied, 442 U.S. 941
(1979); Greenberg v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 480, 483 (Withey, J., concurring), rev'd, 367 F.2d 663
(1st Cir. 1966).
18. See, e.g., Note, The Educational Paradox, 46 Cri.-KENr L. REv. 236, 237 (1969).
19. See, e.g., Horodysky v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 490, 493 (1970) (legal education); Den-
man v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 439, 446 (1967) (engineering degree).
20. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
21. See, ag., Wolfman, Professors and the "Ordinary and Necessary" Business Expense, 112
U. PA. L. REv. 1089, 1096 (1964).
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subsequent regulations dealing with educational expenses have been
based.
B. Hill and Coughlin.
Whether because of the personal nature of such expenses or their
analogy to capital expenditures, the courts disallowed all business de-
ductions for educational expenses for seventeen years following Welch.
In the early 1950s, however, two cases did allow deductions for educa-
tional expenses and formulated the distinctions embodied in subse-
quent regulations governing educational expenses. In Hill v.
Commissionerz 2 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit allowed a
deduction to a school teacher for the cost of summer school courses she
took to fulfill a requirement for recertification. The court held that the
expense was ordinary and necessary and that Office Decision 892,23 de-
nying a deduction for summer school expenses of school teachers,
should not apply when the teacher undertook the education to enable
her to retain her existing position-the distinguishing factor in the
case.24
[N]o practical advantage would accrue to her upon a renewal of her
certificate other than the privilege and power to continue as a
teacher. Clearly, the very logic of the situation here shows that she
went to Columbia to maintain her present position, not to attain a
new position; to preserve, not to expand or increase; to carry on, not
to commence.
2 5
Hill was followed shortly by Coughlin v. Commissioner.26 Cough-
lin expanded the deductibility of educational expenses by allowing a
deduction to a tax attorney for the cost of attending New York Univer-
sity's Institute on Federal Taxation. The Coughlin court narrowed the
effect of the dictum from Welch, that education was a nondeductible
capital expenditure, by arguing that in Welch Cardozo was speaking of
"that knowledge which is obtained for its own sake as an addition to
one's'cultural background or for possible use in some work.. .in the
future." 27 Coughlin, in contrast, incurred expenses to acquire knowl-
edge to be used in an established business. Furthermore, even if
knowledge is generally to be considered a capital asset, the knowledge
Coughlin acquired about current trends in taxation was an exception
22. 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
23. O.D. 892, 4 C.B. 209 (1921).
24. See I.T. 4044, 1951-1 C.B. 16 (the Bureau's response to Hill).
25. 181 F.2d at 909.
26. 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953).
27. Id. at 309.
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because of its "evanescent character. '28 The expenses were therefore
properly deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
The Coughlin court's analysis further developed the distinction be-
tween three types of educational expenses: personal, capital, and cur-
rent business expenses. Under the Coughlin formulation deductions
are disallowed for expenses incurred in acquiring knowledge "for its
own sake" 29 because such a purpose is personal. The opinion suggests
two different means of distinguishing between nondeductible capital
educational expenditures and deductible current business expenses.
The reference to the "evanescent character" 30 of an expenditure implies
that the correct method is to examine the length of time over which the
taxpayer will benefit from the education. This method conforms to the
normal and proper method of distinguishing between current and capi-
tal expenditures; 31 it also suggests capital treatment for nearly all edu-
cational expenses, because most expenditures for education benefit a
number of periods.
Coughlin's second suggested method of distinguishing between
current and capital educational expenses is to determine whether the
education will be used in an established business (current) or in some
future work (capital).32 This method lacks the theoretical justification
underlying the periods-benefited approach because it departs from the
definition of a capital expenditure as one producing income in multiple
periods. Nevertheless, regulations subsequent to Coughlin adopted the
current-business/future-business distinction between deductible and
nondeductible educational expenses, thereby preserving a fundamental
flaw in the treatment of the cost of education.
C. The 1958 Regulation.
Once Hill and Coughlin opened the door to deductibility, the
problem of distinguishing between personal and business-related edu-
cational expenses eclipsed that of distinguishing between currentand
capital expenditures. The facts in Coughlin had not been difficult; the
court noted that the business benefit to Coughlin of attending the tax
institute far overshadowed any personal benefit to him.33 Other cases,
however, present a much more uncertain mix of business and personal
28. Id. at 309-10.
29. Id. at 309.
30. Id. at 310.
31. See note 5 supra and text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
32. 203 F.2d at 309. This method is also supported by language in Hill, characterizing educa-
tion as undertaken "to preserve [a current position], not to expand or increase; to carry on, not to
commence." Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906, 909 (4th Cir. 1950).
33. 203 F.2d at 309.
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motives.34 How to treat these mixed-motive educational expenditures
continues to plague the case law and regulations in this area.35 In re-
sponse to the problem, or perhaps to ward off intervention by Con-
gress, 36 the Treasury in 1958 promulgated a new regulation, section
1.162-5, 37 to govern business deductions for educational expenses. The
major feature of the regulation was the "primary-purpose" test: A
business deduction was allowed if the taxpayer undertook the educa-
tion primarily for the purpose of:
(1) Maintaining or improving skills required by the taxpayer
in his employment or other trade or business, or
(2) Meeting the express requirements of a taxpayer's employer,
or the requirements of applicable law or regulations, imposed as a
condition to the retention by the taxpayer of his salary, status or em-
ployment.38
On the other hand, the taxpayer could not deduct expenses for educa-
tion undertaken primarily for "obtaining a new position or substantial
advancement in position, or. . .[for] fulfilling the general educational
aspirations or other personal purposes of the taxpayer. '3 9 Nor would
the Service permit a deduction if the education was necessary to meet
the minimum requirements for qualification in the taxpayer's trade.40
34. See, e.g., Hoover v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 566 (1961); Green v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.
1154 (1957). In Green, a schoolteacher faced a college credit requirement similar to the one in
Hill. Besides taking several courses that met the requirement to maintain her position, she earned
additional credits and received a master's degree. The Commissioner argued that no deduction
should be allowed because Green's real purpose in attending school was to earn the master's
degree, not to retain her position. The court disagreed, noting that the courses for which the
deduction was sought met the college-credit requirement and were thus clearly business-related,
That they could be, and were, applied towards a graduate degree was merely incidental. Id. at
1156.
35. For a discussion noting that there is no satisfactory way to distinguish between deductible
and nondeductible mixed-motive expenditures, see Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and
Subsidiesfor Personal Expenditures, 16 J. LAW & ECON. 193, 202-04 (1973).
36. See, e.g., H.R. 4662, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). This bill, which was pending at the time
the Treasury promulgated the regulation, would have allowed teachers (the group most often
involved in educational expense cases) a deduction from gross income for expenses incurred in
further education up to $600 over and above any amount allowable as a trade or business expense
under section 162.
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 63, 67.
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 63, 67. Consistent with Welch v.
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933), the regulation provided that custom in the industry ordinarily
would establish whether the education maintained or improved the taxpayer's skills. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-5(a). In practice, however, the lack of custom was not always controlling. See Campbell
v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 941, 945 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (forensic pathologist receives law degree);
Watson v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1014, 1016 (1959) (psychoanalytic training for internist).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b), T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 63, 67.
40. Id. at 67-68. In 1960, the Service elaborated upon the provisions of section 1.162-5 in
Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 C.B. 69.
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The regulation was consistent with the distinction between per-
sonal, capital, and current business expenditures developed in Cough-
fin. The "maintaining or improving skills, .... requirements of...
employer," and "general educational aspirations" provisions related to
the business-personal distinction; the "minimum requirements" and
"new position" phrases were the regulation's attempt to approximate
the current-capital distinction. To distinguish current from capital
educational expenditures, the regulation used the second method sug-
gested in Coughlin---that of determining whether the education will be
used in a current or future business4 '-rather than the periods-
benefited approach. The regulation presumed that education under-
taken to help one advance in position or obtain an altogether new posi-
tion would benefit the future position and the periods in which it was
held rather than the current position, thereby rendering current deduct-
ibility inappropriate.42 The regulation made no provision, however, for
amortization of these expenses over the periods presumed to be bene-
fited. A capital educational expenditure was simply not deductible.
The primary-purpose test created great difficulties for the courts
throughout the life of the 1958 regulation. Because the primary pur-
pose of an expenditure varies from case to case,43 the courts found it
impossible to develop hard and fast rules about the deductibility of a
particular type of expenditure. Precedent had little value; each tax-
payer could claim that his purpose differed from that of another. The
amount of litigation increased 44 and the results were often inconsistent.
Welsh v. United States45 and Condit v. Commissioner,46 both de-
cided by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, provide a classic
example of these inconsistencies. Welsh, an Internal Revenue Service
agent who attended law school at night, left the Service after complet-
ing law school and entered a general legal practice. Condit, an indus-
41. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
42. There are several imperfections in this analysis. Not only do the benefits derived from
most education last for many years regardless of whether the education is related to the presently
occupied position, see text accompanying notes 31-32 supra, but the purpose for which the educa-
tion is sought need not be related to its effect. Some judges have thus argued that education
providing a new skill should be nondeductible even if it also improves skills used in the current
trade, see Greenberg v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 480, 483 (Withey, J., concurring), rev'd, 367 F.2d
663 (1st Cir. 1966), while others assert that education improving skills used in the current trade
should be deductible even if it also entails the acquisition of a new skill, see Greenberg v. Com-
missioner, 45 T.C. at 485 (Fay, J., dissenting).
43. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 63, 67-69, for a discussion of the variety
of purposes.
44. Nine reported cases from 1950, the date of the Hill case, through 1957 involved contested
educational expense deductions. Courts decided an equal number of cases in 1961 alone.
45. 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964).
46. 329 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1964).
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trial accountant who also attended law school at night, remained at his
old job following his graduation. In two per curiam opinions handed
down the same day, the court affirmed both a district court judgment
allowing a deduction to Welsh and a Tax Court judgment denying a
deduction to Condit. The court held that each case involved an issue of
fact-whether the primary purpose of the taxpayer in incurring the ed-
ucational expenses was to improve his skills or to prepare for a new
position-and that in neither case was the lower court clearly erroneous
in its finding.47
Frustration over the inconsistent results generated by the primary-
purpose test eventually led the Tax Court, in a 1966 decision, to ignore
the taxpayer's purpose and rely on prior cases involving similar objec-
tive facts in determining whether to allow a deduction.48 The judge
who had tried the facts dissented, arguing that the precedent could not
control since the taxpayers' purposes differed.49 The court of appeals
agreed with the dissent and reversed.50 The holding of the majority of
the Tax Court, reflecting its dissatisfaction with the primary-purpose
test, was an attempt to use precedent to remove inconsistency,5 1 pro-
vide certainty, and prevent taxpayers from circumventing precedent by
claiming to have a different purpose than prior litigants. The confu-
sion, the inconsistencies, the case load, and the same fear of congres-
sional intervention that had originally inspired the 1958 regulation5 2
led the Service to amend the regulation.
47. Id. at 154; 329 F.2d at 146. Condit and Welsh are sometimes cited for the proposition
that a taxpayer was better off in the district court than in the Tax Court under the primary-
purpose test. See Note, supra note 18, at 241-43. Compare Williams v. United States, 238 F.
Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) with Lamb v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 539 (1966) (different results for
IBM patent trainees who attended law school under same program). While taxpayers did have
somewhat greater success in the district courts, there were numerous exceptions to this rule of
thumb. See, e.g., Huene v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Markham v. United
States, 245 F. Supp. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Charlton v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 420
(1964); Carlucci v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 695 (1962); Watson v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1014
(1959).
48. Greenberg v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 480, 482-83, rep'd, 367 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1966).
49. 45 T.C. at 484-85 (Fay, J., dissenting).
50. 367 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1966).
51. Inconsistency in the courts caused the Commissioner problems in bargaining over audit
disputes that never reached the courts. A 1966 article for accountants described the likelihood of
obtaining a deduction for law school in tones reminiscent of a cross between the stock market
reports and the morning line at the racetrack:
Your chances of getting at least a partial deduction for law school expenses are better
now than they have ever been. In fact, we understand that the Appellate Division is
presently settling such cases by allowing between 50-80% (90% in at least one case) of law
school expenses claimed by accountants. ...
Can You Deduct Your Law School Expensesr, 1 TAX. FOR ACCOUNTANTS 91 (1966). See Nagel,
Accountants, Agents especiallyfavored in deducting law school expenses, 22 J. TAX. 112 (1965).
52. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
1004 [Vol. 1980.997
Vol. 1980:997] DEDUCTING EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES 1005
D. The 1967 Regulation.
On May 1, 1967, the Treasury amended section 1.162-5, replacing
the primary-purpose test with an "objective test."53 A finding that edu-
cation serves to maintain or improve skills used in a trade or business,
or that education is required by the employer, remains the touchstone
of deductibility. The taxpayer's purpose in undertaking the education,
however, is no longer supposed to be relevant; the finding instead must
be an objective one.54 The regulation retains the caveat that a taxpayer
may not deduct expenses for education that is necessary to meet the
minimum requirements for qualification in the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness.55 In addition, no deduction is allowed for expenditures for "edu-
cation which is part of a program of study being pursued by [the
taxpayer] which will lead to qualifying him in a new trade or busi-
ness."' 56 This latter provision applies even if the education maintains or
improves skills required in the current trade or is required by the em-
ployer, and (unlike the 1958 regulation) regardless of whether the tax-
payer intends to enter the new trade. The amended regulation thus
uses a three-step test:57 For educational expenditures to be deductible,
53. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1967) (eliminating language of the 1958 regulation as to
"primary purpose").
54. See id.
55. Id. § 1.162-5(b)(2).
56. Id. § 1.162-5(b)(3).
57. This discussion assumes that the taxpayer is in the relevant trade or business, a prerequi-
site to any section 162 deduction. Whether an individual is actually in the trade or business has
been a major issue in many educational expense deduction cases, because the expenditure often
occurs while the taxpayer is going to school full time rather than actively working. Two types of
cases involve disputes as to whether the taxpayer is in the particular trade: those in which it is
asserted that the taxpayer has abandoned the trade, and those in which the taxpayer allegedly has
not yet become established in the trade.
In the abandonment cases, the courts have rejected the Commissioner's proposed one-year
absence rule in favor of a case-by-case determination whether the taxpayer's absence from work is
temporary (so that he is still in the trade) or indefinite (so that he has abandoned it). See Sherman
v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1191, 1194 (1977) (deduction allowed for two year M.B.A.
program). This approach has occasionally placed the courts in the role of unemployment-benefits
counselors, analyzing how hard an unemployed taxpayer looked for work in order to determine if
his absence from work was temporary or indefinite. See, e.g., Reisinger v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.
568, 573-74 (1979); Picknally v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1292, 1294 (1977).
The issue in the "not yet established" cases is whether, when an individual has worked spo-
radically or for only a short time prior to undertaking educational expenses, that individual
should be treated as not yet "carrying on any trade or business." I.R.C. § 162. The Tax Court has
decided these cases inconsistently. Compare Reisine v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1429
(1970) (engineer employed for one year not yet established) with Ruehmann v. Commissioner, 30
T.C.M. (CCH) 675 (1971) (deduction allowed attorney employed for one summer prior to entering
LL.M. program). The presence or absence of an official certification may be an important factor.
See Haseltine v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1259, 1264 (1979) (deduction allowed for
course taken after receiving license but denied for course taken before licensing). Although this
factor is an objective criterion, it provides no assistance in cases such as Reisine that involve
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the education must maintain or improve relevant skills or be required
by the employer, not constitute part of the minimum requirements for
employment, and not lead to qualifying the taxpayer for a new trade or
business.5 8 Each of these factors is to be determined objectively, so as
to avoid the "mire of the no-man's land of subjective intent"59 encoun-
tered under the primary-purpose test.
Many commentators considered the 1967 regulation more liberal
than its predecessor, 60 and some predicted that the amount of litigation
would decline.6' These predictions, however, have proved to be inac-
curate.62 Despite the hopes for a simpler and more liberal treatment of
educational expenses, the 1967 regulation has produced as much con-
troversy and litigation as its predecessor. It preserves the old regula-
tion's definition of a capital educational expenditure as one which
fulfills minimum requirements or is to be used in a different trade, in-
stead of adopting a proper definition based on the number of periods
benefited.63 Expenditures deemed capital still provide no tax benefit
through amortization. Furthermore, the elimination of the primary-
purpose test and addition of the "lead to qualifying ...in a new
trade" language have restricted deductibility even more than the 1958
regulation did.
II. PROBLEM AREAS IN THE CASES
Consideration of the problems that have arisen under section
1.162-5 is helpful in analyzing the desirability of alternative treatments
of educational expenses. Each of the three elements of the test for de-
termining deductibility has caused difficulties. The following discus-
businesses in which certification or licensing is not customary. Furthermore, licensing alone, with-
out actual employment, should not constitute establishment in the trade if establishment is to be a
meaningful prerequisite to the deductibility of educational expenses. See Randick v. Commis-
sioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 195, 197-98 (1976). A determination on the facts of each case, focusing
on the amount of time worked as the major factor, or, in the alternative, use of a flat time require-
ment, would be preferable. Although the courts have rejected the latter approach in abandonment
disputes, a flat time requirement would presumably be acceptable in reaching the more objective
determination whether a taxpayer is established in the trade or business.
58. For alternative verbal and graphic assessments of the test, see STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) T 1360.01; Note, Taxation Deductibility ofEducational Expensesfor Fultime Graduate
Study, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 584, 585-86 (1972).
59. Helms v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1020, 1023 (1968).
60. E.g., Gage, New Educational Expense Deduction Cases Exhibit a Liberalizing Trend, 34 J.
TAX. 66, 66 (1971); Goggans & Leftwich, "hat is thepresent climatefor the educational expense
deduction?, 31 J. TAX. 236, 240 (1969).
61. Eg., Final education expense regs contain guidelinesfor obtaining deductions, 27 J. TAX.
28, 30 (1967).
62. See note 125 infra.
63. See notes 5 & 42 supra and text accompanying notes 4-5, 41-42 supra.
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sion will outline the major issues and problems under the 1967
regulation and will suggest, as solutions to these problems, preferable
interpretations of the "maintains-or-improves" and "minimum-re-
quirements" tests and urge elimination of the "new-trade-or-business"
test.
A. Maintains or Improves Skills.
The first requirement for deductibility-that the expenditure be
made for education that "[m]aintains or improves skills required by the
individual in his employment or other trade or business"6----distin-
guishes those expenditures undertaken for business purposes from
those made in acquiring education of a personal nature.65 The 1967
regulation thus looks at the relationship between the education and the
duties performed and allows a deduction if the effect of the education is
to maintain or improve business skills, regardless of the taxpayer's pri-
mary purpose. With the exception of cases involving travel,66 the
maintains-or-improves-skills requirement presently figures in a rela-
tively small number of cases. The minimum-requirements test and the
new-trade-or-business test often present simpler means of deciding
cases that could otherwise be decided under the maintains-or-im-
proves-skills test.
When the courts do address the maintains-or-improves-skills issue,
however, they permit the deduction if there is a "proximate" relation-
ship 67 between the education and the skills to be improved. The Tax
Court developed this test in Carroll v. Commissioner,68 a case disallow-
ing a policeman's deduction for the cost of his liberal arts education.
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(1) (1967).
65. See text following note 21 supra.
66. The regulation allows a deduction for expenses of educational travel when "the major
portion of the activities [while traveling] is of a nature which directly maintains or improves skills
required by the individual in [his] employment .. " Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(d) (1967). Most of
the cases involve teachers who travel during summer vacations or while on sabbatical and seek
deductions based on the increased knowledge they pass on to their students or the techniques they
learn from other school systems. See, e.g., Allison v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1114
(1977), aff'd, No. 78-1277 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 1979); Marchionni v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH)
1342 (1976). The courts require that particularly identified job skills be improved; general cultural
broadening through normal tourist activities is insufficient. See Krist v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d
1345, 1348 (2d Cir. 1973). Generally, the taxpayer must put forth a strong, well-documented case
to obtain a deduction. See, e.g., Haynie v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1326 (1977); Marlin
v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 560 (1970). But see Johnson v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 630
(1979).
67. Carroll v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 213, 219 (1968), a 'd, 418 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1969). The
concurring opinion, discussing the 1958 regulation, describes the required relationship as one of a
"reasonable nexus." 51 T.C. at 220 (Tannenwald, J., concurring).
68. 51 T.C. 213 (1968), aft'd, 418 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1969).
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The court has also applied the test to deny deductions for the cost of
education that is clearly business-oriented, but that develops skills
more appropriate to a position of greater authority than the one occu-
pied by the taxpayer. 69
B. Minimum Educational Requirements.
The minimum-educational-requirements test is intended to sepa-
rate current, ordinary, and necessary expenses from expenditures of a
capital nature.70 The courts have grappled with two major problems in
connection with the minimum-requirements test. The first of these
problems involves determining whether minimum requirements have
been met in cases in which individuals are already employed but face
additional educational requirements. The courts have decided these
cases by distinguishing between apprentices and established employees.
If the taxpayer is performing the full scope of duties of one in the pro-
fession, he has met the profession's minimum educational require-
ments, and the cost of any additional required education is
deductible.7' If, on the other hand, the taxpayer is performing some
duties but needs further schooling to enable him to perform more ad-
vanced duties, he is like an apprentice who has not met the minimum
educational requirements of his trade72 and expenditures for the addi-
tional schooling are not deductible. 73 For example, college teaching
69. See Heffernan v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 86, 87 (1979) (accounting clerk denied
deduction for M.B.A. expenses); Mcllvoy v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 987, 989 (1979)
(electronics technician denied deduction for M.B.A. expenses); Hogue v. Commissioner, 37
T.C.M. (CCH) 126, 127 (1978) ("wide disparity between the scope of duties performed by an
orderly or ward clerk and a hospital administrative assistant").
70. See Hering v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1329, 1331 (1974). Although the regula-
tion speaks of the expense of meeting minimum educational requirements as "an inseparable ag-
gregate of personal and capital expenditures," Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) (1967), the expenditure is
clearly of a business rather than personal nature if it pays for education that is a minimum re-
quirement for qualification in a trade.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Michaeisen, 313 F.2d 668, 671-72 (9th Cir. 1963).
72. See, e.g., Rombach v. United States, 440 F.2d 1356 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (patent trainee); John-
ston v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1112 (1978) (law clerk); Jungreis v. Commissioner, 55
T.C. 581 (1970) (graduate teaching assistant).
73. Courts decide many of these apprentice/established-employee cases, however, by using
the new-trade-or-business test. See text accompanying notes 100-08 infra. See, e.g., Weiszmann
v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 817, 819-20 (10th Cir. 1973); Lamb v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 539, 544-
45 (1966), appeal dismissed, 390 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1968). The results often hinge on semantic
arguments about whether the taxpayer has in fact entered a new trade or business. See, e.g.,
Weiler v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 398, 401 (1970), in which the taxpayer, an accountant who be-
came a lawyer, unsuccessfully asserted that he could deduct the cost of law school because he had
been an "income tax professional" all along. See also Weiszmann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d at
8 19-20 (education qualified patent trainee for new profession as patent attorney). Conceptually,
the more accurate distinction in such cases is between apprentices and established employees, and
it is therefore more appropriate that these cases be decided under the minimum-requirements test.
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assistants, 74 law clerks,75 and patent trainees76 are treated as appren-
tices; teachers are normally considered to have met the minimum re-
quirements of their profession even if they are required to take
additional courses.77
The apprentice/established-employee test does have important
limitations, however. Although the test is easily applied to teachers,
law students, and teaching assistants, it raises some troublesome ques-
tions when there are a number of steps in the job hierarchy, as in Jo-
sephs v. Commissioner.7 8 Josephs held three positions-technician,
senior technician, and assistant engineer-at various times, and each
position required a different amount of engineering education. The
Tax Court denied a deduction for the cost of courses that qualified the
taxpayer for advancement beyond the position of technician, because
the courses were part of the minimum requirements for employment as
an assistant engineer.79
The case indicates that the courts, in determining the minimum
educational requirements of the taxpayer's employment, often apply
the requirements of a higher-level position upon a full range of lower-
level jobs.80 This application of the minimum-requirements test is not
justified, however, when the lower positions on the hierarchy are em-
ployment goals in themselves and not mere waystations through which
everyone passes on the path to a single, ultimate position. Although
"students do not enroll in law school to get a job as a law clerk [but
rather to] .. .become a lawyer,"8' many engineering technicians re-
main engineering technicians of different grades and do not become
engineers. Courts should consider the nature of the duties performed
in the lower-level positions, the percentage of occupants who move
on,82 and the amount of time spent in each position before designating
74. See, e.g., Jungreis v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 581 (1970).
75. See, e.g., Johnston v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1112 (1978).
76. See, e.g., Weiszmann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1973); Sandt v. Commis-
sioner, 303 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1962); Rombach v. United States, 440 F.2d 1356 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Lamb
v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 539 (1966), appeal dismissed, 390 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1968).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Michaelsen, 313 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1963).
78. 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 138 (1979); Gf Diaz v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1067, 1070 n.3 (1978),
af'd, No. 79-4040 (2d Cir. June 25, 1979) (illustrating several levels of public school teaching
assistant).
79. 39 T.C.M. (CCH) at 139.
80. The Josephs court borrowed the notion that the minimum-requirements test is to be ap-
plied separately to each position within a given trade from the opinion in Davis v. Commissioner,
65 T.C. 1014, 1020 (1976). See 39 T.C.M. (CCH) at 139.
81. Johnston v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1112, 1113 (1978).
82. See Jungreis v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 581, 586 (1970).
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any one position to control the minimum educational requirements of
an entire trade.
The second problem of the minimum-requirements test is encoun-
tered in answering the question "required by whom?" The regulation
provides that the minimum requirements "must be determined from a
consideration of such factors as the requirements of the employer, the
applicable law and regulations, and the standards of the profession,
trade, or business involved. '83 The troublesome cases typically involve
individuals qualified for and actually practicing a profession who are
required to obtain additional training upon moving to a new state or
position;8 4 the question is what standards represent the minimum edu-
cation required of the "foreigner. '8 5 In practice, courts have looked at
three distinct but irreconcilable sources to determine the minimum ed-
ucation required of a particular taxpayer: the requirements of the old
place or employer, the requirements of the new place or employer, and
the requirements normally found in the trade. Laurano v. Commis-
sioner 6 illustrates the focus on the original employer or place of em-
ployment. In that case, the court allowed a teacher already certified in
Toronto to deduct the cost of a course required for certification in New
Jersey, her new home. Although the case may be based in part on a
misreading of the regulation,87 there is significant logical force in the
proposition that once an individual has been deemed a member of the
profession, satisfying the applicable requirements, any educational ex-
pense incurred afterward is undertaken "to preserve, not to expand or
increase; to carry on, not to commence." 88 On the other hand, focusing
on the old employer subsidizes individuals who initially become certi-
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(i) (1967).
84. See, e.g., Sharon v. Commissioner, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 442 U.S.
941 (1979); Laurano v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 723 (1978): Antuna v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1778 (1977); Horodysky v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 490 (1970); Rev. Rul. 71-58, 1971-1 C.B.
55. In some cases, however, the taxpayer has not moved. See Toner v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.
772 (1979), rev'd, 623 F.2d 315 (3rd Cir. 1980).
85. Several of these "foreigner cases" have been decided under the qualification-for-new-
trade-or-business requirement. See, e.g., Sharon v. Commissioner, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). They are discussed at this point because the factual problem
involved is the same.
86. 69 T.C. 723 (1978).
87. The court relied on the following sentence in the regulation: "Once an individual has
met the minimum educational requirements for qualification in his employment or other trade or
business (as in effect when he enters the employment or trade or business), he shall be treated as
continuing to meet those requirements even though they are changed." See id. at 728 (quoting
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(i) (1967). This language, however, was intended to refer to changes
made over time rather than to changes of location. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2)(iii)(Ex. (1))
(Sit. 4) (1967); ef. Robertson v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 1153 (1962) (decided under 1958 regula-
tion).
88. Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906, 909 (4th Cir. 1950).
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fled or employed in the state or position invoking the fewest require-
ments, thereby gaining the tax advantage of a deduction for the cost of
education subsequently undertaken to qualify elsewhere.
Focusing on the new location or employer eliminates the subsidi-
zation incentive, but introduces another problem in deciding who the
new standard-setter is. Only when the taxpayer actually changes em-
ployment prior to audit or litigation would the minimum requirement
be clear. In other cases, a fact-finder applying a "new place or em-
ployer" minimum-requirements test would have to guess where the tax-
payer intends to work and whether he plans to change jobs.89
Focusing on the third test, that of the normal educational require-
ments of the trade or profession, avoids the problems raised by the
other two alternatives.90 Under this test, an individual desiring to teach
would not be able to deduct the cost of college by initially taking a job
as a teacher in a parochial school that required teachers to have only a
high school diploma, as is possible under the "old place or employer"
alternative.91 Moreover, any speculation as to the taxpayer's intent
would be avoided. The regulation itself92 encourages consideration of
the normal requirements of the trade or profession; this approach rep-
resents the most sensible interpretation of the minimum-educational-
requirements test in situations of changed employer or place of em-
ployment.
C. Qualcation for New Trade or Business.
Section 1.162-5(b)(3), which disallows a deduction for any educa-
tion "which will lead to qualifying [the taxpayer] in a new trade or
business, ' 93 is probably the most controversial and most litigated pro-
vision of the 1967 regulation. The section replaces language in the old
89. Antuna v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1778 (1977), illustrates this problem. The
taxpayer was a pediatric social worker, initially employed by Stanford University. She moved to
Miami and took a position there, also as a pediatric social worker. Her new employer required a
Master's Degree in Social Work for employment as a pediatric social worker and conditioned
hiring Antuna on her receiving this degree. The court denied a deduction for the cost of the
degree, holding that the determinant for the minimum-requirements test as "the requirements of a
particular employer for a particular job." Id. at 1780. If Antuna had received her degree while
employed at Stanford, the case, on its own reasoning, would have come out the other way.
90. Judge Chabot advocated this approach in his concurring opinion in Toner v. Commis-
sioner, 71 T.C. 772, 784 (1979), rev'd, 623 F.2d 315 (3rd Cir. 1980), which denied a deduction for
college courses to a parochial school teacher. Her employer's minimum requirement was a high
school diploma, but the public schools required a college degree. 71 T.C. at 775, 778-79.
91. Id. Nor could an individual deduct the cost of law school by first practicing in a state
such as Montana, where law school is not required to pass the bar. See Vetrick v. Commissioner,
37 T.C.M. (CCH) 392 (1978).
92. See text at note 83 supra.
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3) (1967).
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section 1.162-5(b) that denied a deduction for the cost of "education
undertaken primarily for the purpose of obtaining a new position or
substantial advancement in position." 94 The new section seeks to pre-
serve the practice of defining capital educational expenditures as those
that benefit a new trade, instead of asking whether the expenditure will
benefit more than one year. Treatment of expenses under the new reg-
ulation, however, indicates a departure from the current-trade/new-
trade distinction as applied prior to the 1967 amendment. Two factors
have contributed to this departure. The courts have been excessively
strict in distinguishing between different "trades" that are in fact parts
of the same trade. Furthermore, by adding the "lead to" language to
the new-trade test and eliminating consideration of the taxpayer's pur-
pose, the new regulation prohibits deductions in many cases in which
the taxpayer neither leaves nor intends to leave his current trade.
The major formulation of what constitutes a new trade occurred in
Glenn v. Commissioner95 and Davis v. Commissioner.96 The Tax Court
held in these two cases that the activities the taxpayer was qualified to
perform before attaining a particular degree, certificate, or title must be
compared with his qualifications after receiving the degree. If a sub-
stantial difference exists, any education leading to the degree is nonde-
ductible under the new-trade-or-business test.97 Glenn, which denied a
deduction for the expenses of a certified public accountant examination
review course, held that uncertified public accountants and certified
public accountants are engaged in different trades;98 similarly, Davis
implied that a social worker undertaking education that would qualify
her to be a professor of social work was entering a new trade.99
The Glenn-Davis test, as formulated, presents a sensible approach
to determining what constitutes a new trade. In applying the test, how-
ever, the courts too often have found substantial differences between
duties even though the positions are essentially within the same trade.
Glenn exemplifies this approach. l00 The test has created particular dif-
94. T.D. 6291, 1958-1 C.B. 63, 67.
95. 62 T.C. 270 (1974).
96. 65 T.C. 1014 (1976). Davis, which denied a social worker a deduction for the cost of a
degree required to become a professor of social work, was decided under the minimum-require-
ments test, but courts have relied on it in new-trade-or-business cases for its succinct restatement
of the Glenn test: "If substantial differences exist in the tasks and activities of various occupations
or employments, then each such occupation or employment constitutes a separate trade or busi-
ness." Id. at 1019.
97. Id. at 1019; 62 T.C. at 275.
98. 62 T.C. at 275.
99. See 65 T.C. at 1020-21.
100. The Glenn court listed, as the two major factors that influenced its decision, the fact that
state law allowed certified public accountants to engage in a tax practice as well as perform all
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ficulties and unconvincing arguments in cases, including the "for-
eigner" cases,10' that should have been decided as minimum-
requirements cases. The courts have held, for example, that an intern
pharmacist is not engaged in the same trade as a registered pharma-
cist,10 2 that a parochial school teacher and a public school teacher are
engaged in different trades, 03 and that a New York attorney and a
California attorney are in different lines of work. °4 Although the
Glenn-Davis comparison-of-duties test may be useful in some situa-
tions,105 it becomes a less respected tool when used to reach the un-
sound results described above. The new-trade-or-business test has
provoked further controversy because the regulation provides more lib-
eral treatment for teachers than for other taxpayers. The regulation
contains a series of examples' °6 illustrating the proposition that "all
teaching and related duties shall be considered to involve the same gen-
eral type of work." 10 7 At least two of these examples clearly violate the
Glenn-Davis test. 08
Application of the new-trade-or-business test is further compli-
cated because the regulation speaks of education that will leadto quali-
fying the taxpayer in a new trade or business. This is the important
new feature of the 1967 regulation. Any education that leads to qualifi-
cation in a new trade or business is automatically nondeductible; the
taxpayer is conclusively presumed to have undertaken the education
for the purpose of qualifying for the new trade.'0 9 The new test thereby
functions public accountants were allowed to perform, and that certified public accountants were
generally considered to possess a higher degree of professional competence than uncertified public
accountants. 62 T.C. at 275-76.
The notion that higher competence indicates the attainment of a new trade contrasts with the
language in the regulation that the initial test for determining deductibility is whether the educa-
.tion maintains or improves skills. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(1) (1967). Although the ability to en-
gage in a tax practice is significant, this fact alone, when compared with the duties that both
certified and uncertified public accountants are allowed to perform, should not be sufficient to
designate the two groups as being engaged in different trades.
101. See text accompanying notes 83-92 supra.
102. Antzoulatos v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1426 (1975).
103. Toner v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 772 (1979), rev'd, 623 F.2d 315 (3rd Cir. 1980).
104. Sharon v. Commissioner, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979).
105. See, e.g., Reisinger v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 568 (1979) (licensed practical nurse to phy-
sician's assistant); Hogue v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 126 (1978) (hospital orderly and
ward clerk to hospital administrative assistant).
106. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3) (1967).
107. Id.
108. See id., examples (c) (classroom teacher to guidance counselor) and (d) (classroom
teacher to principal). See also Rev. Rul. 68-580, 1968-2 C.B. 72.
109. See Gaines v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1415, 1418 (1976). The new regulation
essentially adopts the Commissioner's interpretation of the old regulation. See Rev. Rul. 60-97,
1960-1 C.B. 69, 73-74. The taxpayer need not actually acquire the degree, certificate, or title in
order for a disputed educational expenditure to be rendered nondeductible. In Glenn v. Commis-
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purports to avoid the dilemma encountered under the 1958 regulation
of trying to determine whether an individual intends to remain in his
old profession, or to use his education to move on to greener pastures.
This "lead to" element of the new-trade-or-business test, however,
has failed in practice to eliminate consideration of the taxpayer's intent
because the courts have been unable to apply the test in a reasonable
and objective manner. In many cases, of course, it is clear that the
education leads to a particular trade or business, as illustrated by law
school and by certified public accountant exam review courses. In
many other cases, however, education is helpful in the pursuit of a vari-
ety of trades. Theoretically, no deduction would be allowed in these
latter cases because the education would qualify the taxpayer for some
new trade regardless of the business he was previously engaged in. The
cost of an undergraduate education, therefore, typically would be non-
deductible given the great variety of occupations requiring bachelors'
degrees of entry-level job candidates. 10 The combination of a narrow
definition of trade or business under the Glenn-Davis test and a broad
interpretation of what leads to a new trade seems to jeopardize most
potential deductions."'
In fact, however, the courts sometimes have allowed deductions
even when the education arguably led to qualifying for a new trade or
business. In Cooper v. Commissioner,"2 for example, the court denied
an unlicensed accountant a deduction for accounting courses because
the courses would lead to qualifying him to sit for the certified public
accountant exam. The court allowed a deduction to the same taxpayer,
however, for the cost of mathematics, finance, and economics courses
which the court found would be useful in advising his clients. The
court did not mention that these courses might lead to qualifying the
taxpayer as a mathematician, stockbroker, or financial analyst.
sioner, 62 T.C. at 276-77, for example, the court held that the review course led to a new trade
even though Glenn failed to pass the certification exam.
110. See Anaheim Paper Mill Supplies, Inc. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 403, 406
(1978) ("Receipt of an undergraduate degree qualified [an employee] for any number of occupa-
tions that were substantially different from his employment"). Deductions for the cost of under-
graduate degrees thus appear to be unobtainable under the 1967 regulation. See, e.g., Thorbahn
v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 342 (1979); Cangelosi v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH)
1070 (1977); Garwood v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 699 (1974). Glasgow v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d
1045 (10th Cir. 1973), the one case allowing a deduction for an undergraduate degree, was decided
under the 1958 regulation.
111. See, e.g., Josephs v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 138, 139 (1979) (engineering
courses qualified engineering technician to take exam to become certified professional engineer,
held to be a new trade).
112. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 955 (1979).
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In Randick v. Commissioner"3 the court indicated in dictum that it
might allow an attorney to deduct the cost of several accounting
courses. 114 Nowhere did the court mention that these courses could
lead to qualifying the taxpayer as an accountant. In Kosmal v. Commis-
sioner 1 5 a Los Angeles Deputy District Attorney took Spanish lessons
to help him interview Spanish-speaking witnesses and crime victims.
The court allowed a deduction for the cost of the lessons, without ad-
dressing whether the education may have led to qualifying the taxpayer
for a new career as an interpreter.
The holdings in those cases, however, conflict with others in which
deductions have been denied on similar facts. For example, Cooper, in
which the court permitted an accountant's deduction for mathematics
and finance courses, contrasts with Cangelosi v. Commissioner,"6 in
which the court denied a computer programmer a deduction for
courses leading to a bachelor's degree in mathematics. The court ac-
knowledged that the courses improved his skills as a computer
programmer, but found that the education qualified the taxpayer for a
new, but unnamed, trade." 7 The dictum in Randick intimating that
the court might allow an attorney a deduction for the cost of account-
ing courses contrasts with Cooper's denial of a deduction to an account-
ant for the cost of accounting courses. Finally, Kosmal, in which an
attorney was allowed to deduct the cost of Spanish lessons, contrasts
with Garwood v. Commissioner,"" in which the court denied a deduc-
tion to a substitute teacher for the expenses of earning a French degree.
One basis for the decision was that the education qualified Garwood
for the new trade of interpreter." 9
The major distinction between cases allowing deductions and
cases denying them on the basis of leading to a new trade, when the
existence of the new trade is not obvious, is the court's perception of
how the taxpayer is likely to use the education. The Randick court
acknowledged that had it known more facts, it would have been influ-
enced by Randick's motives in taking the accounting courses.' 20
113. 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 195 (1976).
114. Id. at 198-99. The court did not reach the question because the taxpayer failed to carry
his factual burden. Id.
115. 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 651 (1979), appeal docketed, No. 5637-78 (9th Cir. May 6, 1980).
116. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1070 (1977).
117. Id.
118. 62 T.C. 699 (1974).
119. Id. at 703.
120. 35 T.C.M. (CCH) at 199. See also Thorbabn v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 342
(1979), denying a deduction for a psychology degree. The court noted that although the taxpayer's
primary purpose in pursuing the degree was irrelevant under the 1967 regulation, his intent to
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In short, the assumption that an attorney taking Spanish lessons
does not generally intend to become an interpreter does influence the
court's decision whether the education leads to qualifying the taxpayer
for a new trade or business. The court might be more suspicious of an
interpreter, working for the Los Angeles District Attorney's office, who
took a few law courses to help him interview crime victims and wit-
nesses, even though the situation seems essentially the same as Kosmal.
This covert resurrection of the investigation of the taxpayer's pur-
pose, with the resulting inconsistencies, is perhaps the most disturbing
problem that has arisen under the 1967 regulation, given the regula-
tion's goal of making objective the determination of the deductibility of
educational expenses. 121 In order to place some boundary on what
leads to a new trade, the courts have continued to examine the tax-
payer's likely purpose. This fact, and other difficulties with the regula-
tion, suggest that alternative ways of dealing with the deductibility of
educational expenses should be considered.
III. ALTERNATIVE TREATMENTS OF EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES 12 2
A. Overview.
The 1967 version of section 1.162-5,123 by abandoning the
primary-purpose test, was intended to decrease the amount and com-
plexity of litigation concerning business deductions for educational ex-
penses. Many thought it provided more liberal treatment of these
expenditures than the 1958 regulation had offered.124 The 1967 regula-
tion has failed, however, to live up to expectations. Educational ex-
penses continue to comprise one of the most litigated areas in
taxation. 125 Although the primary-purpose test is no longer officially
part of the regulation, the taxpayer's intent is still relevant in determin-
ing whether he is carrying on a trade or business, 26 and has infiltrated
pursue a management position with the degree tended to "highlight" that the education qualified
him for a new trade. Id. at 345.
121. See note 57 supra and text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
122. The discussion will focus on alternatives that provide a more accurate measurement of
net income, rather than on means of supporting and encouraging education or of providing relief
to taxpayers with children in college. For discussion of the latter topic, see McNulty; Zinman,
Educational Expense: Deduction, Capital Expenditure or Credit, 27 TAX EXECUTIVE 17 (1974);
Wolfman, The Cost of Education and the Federal Income Tax, 42 F.R.D. 535 (1966) (presented to
the 3d Circuit Judicial Conference, Sept. 9, 1966).
123. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1967).
124. See authorities cited in notes 60-61 supra.
125. Samuels & Samuels, supra note 6. The number of reported cases dealing with § 1.162-5
has not decreased appreciably under the 1967 version. In fact, the largest number of cases re-
ported in a single year occurred in 1978.
126. See note 57 supra.
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the determination of such issues as whether minimum requirements
have been satisfied' 27 and whether education is leading to a new
trade. 28 Furthermore, the new regulation continues to present confus-
ing and sometimes illogical results. One revenue ruling, for example,
states that deductions are permissible for unaccredited correspondence
courses in law, but not for courses taken at an accredited law school.12 9
This subsidizes the very education that the Service regards as of a lesser
quality. The narrow definition of trade or business, 30 and the denial of
deductions under the new-trade-or-business test to individuals who
clearly intend to remain in their old trade,13' have belied the predic-
tions of increased liberality. The fact that some groups, particularly
teachers, receive more favorable treatment than others has led to con-
fusion in the cases and attacks on the perceived arbitrariness of the
regulation. 132
B. Elimination of the New-Trade-or-Business Test.
Most of the problems encountered under the 1967 regulation arise
from the new-trade-or-business test. The definition of what constitutes
a new trade, and the "leads to" element of the test, are especially trou-
blesome133 and make the current section 1.162-5 less beneficent to the
taxpayer than its predecessor. Moreover, the denial of a deduction for
expenses of non-minimum-requirement education that is helpful to a
taxpayer's current business-denied because that education also hap-
pens to lead to a different trade-is conceptually undesirable, especially
when the taxpayer does not intend to enter the new trade or when the
education is required by the current employer.134
Eliminating the new-trade-or-business test would result in more
equitable treatment of educational expenses without opening the flood-
127. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
128. See text accompanying notes 112-20 supra.
129. Rev. RuL 76-62, 1976-1 C.B. 12. The distinction is that unaccredited courses do not lead
to qualifying the individual to take the bar exam.
130. See notes 96 and 100 supra and text accompanying notes 95-108 supra.
131. See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19578 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Reed v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1508 (1978); O'Donnell v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 781 (1974),
aft'd, 519 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1975). This classification includes those individuals required by
their employer to undertake the education for which the deduction is denied. See Ardavany v.
Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 569 (1979); Roussel v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 565
(1979).
132. See, e.g., Melnik v. United States, 521 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
911 (1976); Gaines v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1415 (1976); O'Donnell v. Commissioner,
62 T.C. 781 (1974), aft'd, 519 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1975); Weiszmann v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.
1106, 1111-12 (1969). See also R. GOODE 82.
133. See text accompanying notes 93-121 supra.
134. See Roussel v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 565 (1979).
1017
DUKE LAWJOU[.AL
gates to a great number of unjustified deductions. An examination of
cases denying deductions under the new-trade-or-business test reveals
that if the test were eliminated, most deductions would still be denied
because of the application of the remaining requirements of the regula-
tion. But in cases in which eliminating the new-trade-or-business test
would change the result, the change would be appropriate.
Many of the new-trade-or-business cases that contain the most
questionable definitions of what constitutes a new trade, including the
foreigner cases 135 and other apprenticeship cases, 136 would be more ap-
propriately decided under the minimum-requirements test. 137 Some of
the other cases holding that the taxpayer is qualifying for a new trade
or business could be decided instead on the ground that the taxpayer is
not yet established in his trade. 138 Finally, a large number of cases
denying deductions under the new-trade-or-business test could reach
the same result by holding that the education fails to bear a direct and
proximate relationship to the taxpayer's business duties. 139 This would
be the outcome, for instance, in many of the cases in which a taxpayer
not professionally involved in the law seeks a deduction for the cost of
attending law school.14°
Eliminating the new-trade-or-business test would allow deductions
in cases in which the education is related to the taxpayer's trade but
also leads to qualification in what courts now might consider a new
trade. In fact, many cases decided under this test involve questionable
holdings regarding whether the position the education led to was actu-
ally in a separate trade.' 41
135. See, e.g., Sharon v. Commissioner, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
941 (1979); Toner v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 772 (1979), rep'd, 623 F.2d 315 (3rd Cir. 1980); Rev.
Rul. 75-412, 1975-2 C.B. 62. See text accompanying notes 83-92 supra.
136. See, e.g., Johnston v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1112 (1978); McDermott v. Com-
missioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 144 (1977); Antzoulatos v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1426
(1975); Garwood v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 699 (1974). See text accompnaying notes 70-82 supra.
137. See text accompanying notes 100-08 supra.
138. See note 57 supra. Cf. Wassenaar v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1195 (1979) (decided on both
grounds).
139. See, e.g., Fleischer v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1968) (entertainer obtained
psychology degree); Ramella v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 747 (1979) (printer took real
estate courses); Hogue v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 126 (1978) (ward clerk obtained degree
in hospital administration); cf. Anaheim Paper Mill Supplies, Inc. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M.
(CCH) 403 (1978) (decided on both grounds).
140. See, e.g., Bouchard v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1098 (1977) (math professor);
Dinsmore v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1008 (1977) (computer assistant project manager);
Bodley v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1357 (1971) (vocational school teacher); Rev. Rul. 72-450, 1972-
2 C.B. 89 (artillery officer).
141. See, e.g., Josephs v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 138 (1979) (engineer and certified
professional engineer); Cangelosi v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1070 (1977) (computer
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The results in a number of law school cases would also be altered
when the taxpayer's current trade was somehow law-related. Again, an
examination of the facts of such cases reveals that the change would be
justified, because the education is required by the employer 142 or be-
cause the taxpayer continues to engage in the old trade. In O'Donnell v.
Commissioner, 43 for example, the court denied a deduction for the cost
of a legal education to an accountant employed in the tax department
of a major accounting firm. His employer encouraged the accountants
in the department to obtain law degrees, and a substantial majority of
the taxpayer's co-workers had done so. Examples of other cases in
which deductions for legal education previously denied would be al-
lowed if the new-trade-or-business test were eliminated involve a his-
tory professor, 44 a medical expert in medical malpractice litigation, 45
and a judge. 146 In all but one of these cases the taxpayer used his new
knowledge in his previous employment, rather than embarking on a
new career in law. 147
Of course, a taxpayer sometimes undertakes a course of study in
order to change from one related business to another. Given the edu-
cation's nexus to the initial business, however, deductibility should not
be denied. The primary-purpose test and the new-trade-or-business
test both fail to provide reasoned and manageable approaches to such
situations. Eliminating the new-trade-or-business test would abandon
the search for a means of disqualifying deductions for education that
aids a taxpayer in both current and future employment. Rather, it
would recognize that once an individual meets the minimum require-
ments of the profession in which he is engaged, he is entitled to a de-
duction for any subsequent education that aids him in that profession,
whether or not it also enables him eventually to change to another re-
lated business.148
Taxpayers whose deductions have been the subject of litigation 149
programmer and unspecified new trade resulting from acquisition of math degree); Glenn v. Com-
missioner, 62 T.C. 270 (1974) (accountant and certified public accountant).
142. See Ardavany v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 569 (1979).
143. 62 T.C. 781 (1974). See also Taubman v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 814 (1973).
144. Reed v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1508 (1978).
145. Anderson v. United States, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9578 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
146. Carter v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 350 (1979).
147. The exception is Carter, the judge was defeated for reelection after graduating from law
school.
148. See Commissioner v. Johnson, 313 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 1963); Wolfman, supra note
122, at 546.
149. See Diaz v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1067 (1978), aft'd, 607 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1979); Dins-
more v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1008 (1977); Feistman v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 129
(1974).
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have unsuccessfully proposed two compromises between the current
system and elimination of the new-trade-or-business test. Both alterna-
tives would significantly narrow the scope of the "leads to" language.
The first method, the "last-step" test, would not consider education as
qualifying the taxpayer for a new trade unless and until the taxpayer
actually completes all requirements for qualification in the trade. Ad-
vocates of this test include individuals who pursue education leading to
a new trade but do not pass certification exams for the trade.'50 An-
other alternative is the degree-nondegree test, which would allow a de-
duction for educational expenses to students who are not candidates for
degrees.' 5 ' These two proposals would effectuate the current test's goal
of denying deductions to individuals undertaking education in order to
change their occupations, but contrary to the current approach, would
allow deductions to those who will not actually change trades.
Adoption of either the last-step test or the degree-nondegree test,
however, would pose enforcement problems. The outcome of each case
would be dictated by the time at which the determination is made. A
taxpayer will ordinarily not have entered a new trade at the time a
deduction is taken, but he may decide to take the last step toward certi-
fication or change from nondegree to degree status at some later date.
A recapture provision, in which any deduction taken would be added
back into income if the taxpayer completes the last step, would help
alleviate this problem, but would operate imperfectly because of the
time value of money152 and simple problems of enforcement.
Both alternatives to outright elimination of the new-trade-or-
business test admittedly present problems, but these problems should
be evaluated in comparison with the current system. The new-trade-or-
business test contains inequities of its own which make it less desirable
than the proposed alternatives. The common feature of the new-trade-
or-business test and its alternatives is that each operates as an attempt
to forecast how the taxpayer will use the education. The essential dif-
ference is that the current new-trade-or-business test errs further in this
forecast on the strict side of the primary-purpose test than do the alter-
natives. A still better solution, however, is to recognize that the main-
tains-or-improves-skills and minimum-requirements tests are sufficient,
and to eliminate the new-trade-or-business test entirely.
150. See Diaz v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1067 (1978), aj'd, 607 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1979); Dins-
more v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1008 (1977).
151. See Feistman v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 129 (1974).
152. Dishonest taxpayers thus could use the last-step test as an interest-free loan for part of the
cost of education.
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C. Capitalization and Amortization.
The last-step test, the degree-nondegree test, and outright elimina-
tion of the new-trade-or-business test would all improve the tax treat-
ment of educational expenses. Focusing solely on these alternatives,
however, overlooks the broader problem. The major flaw in section
1.162-5 is not its inconsistency, its broad definition of "new trade," or
its susceptibility to subjective considerations, but rather its failure to
comport with a theoretically sound treatment of educational expenses
as capital expenditures. The proper treatment for most educational ex-
penditures, assuming that they satisfy the reasonable-nexus test and are
thereby deemed business-related, 53 is to capitalize the expenditure and
amortize the cost over the useful life of the education.
Errors in the definition and treatment of capital educational ex-
penditures distinguish the current regulation from a proper characteri-
zation of educational expenses. These errors result in excessively
liberal treatment of some expenditures and excessively strict treatment
of others. The definitional error lies in the regulation's adoption of the
Coughlin court's current-business/nw-business test 154 to distinguish
current from capital expenditures. The proper distinction, however,
depends not on whether the expenditure will benefit a new or old trade,
or will satisfy the minimum requirements to engage in a business, but
rather on the number of years the expenditure will benefit. An amount
spent to benefit one period is a current expense and should be deducti-
ble as an ordinary and necessary business expense.1 55 If the expendi-
ture benefits a number of periods, it is a capital expenditure-which
falls outside the scope of section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code.156
In fact, nearly all educational expenditures will benefit more than a
single tax period, and are therefore capital in nature.
153. The approach the regulation takes in attempting to distinguish between personal and
business expenditures is the most satisfactory method of making this determination, even though
it may not be theoretically correct. By demonstrating either that the education is required by the
employer or that it satisfies the reasonable-nexus test, the taxpayer makes a sufficient showing that
the expenditure is business-related rather than personal. The alternative to this approach is the
1958 regulation's examination of the taxpayer's primary purpose. The problems with this alterna-
tive are well illustrated in Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform
Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 859, 866-76 (1974).
154. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
155. I.R.C. § 162(a).
156. "A capital expenditure is not deductible as an 'ordinary' business expense. It is well-
settled that money paid out for the acquirement of something of permanent use or value in one's
business is a capital investment and not deductible from income as an 'ordinary' business ex-
pense." Acer Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 512, 514 (8th Cir. 1942). See I.R.C. § 263;
Zinman, supra note 122, at 24.
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The error in treatment of educational expenses is the failure to
allow the taxpayer at any time to deduct those expenditures deemed
capital. Normally capital expenditures are viewed as giving rise to as-
sets, tangible or intangible, that will be useful to the taxpayer for some
amount of time in excess of one year. The proper tax treatment for
such expenditures, when business-related, is to depreciate or amortize
them over the useful life of the asset. 57 Under the current regulation,
however, educational expenditures that are classified as capital are not
treated in the same manner as expenditures for other capital assets.
Rather than allowing depreciation of the expenditure over the useful
life of the education, the Service permits no deduction at all. 158 Profes-
sor Richard Goode analogizes the current treatment of educational ex-
penditures to a system in which deductions are allowed for the
maintenance, repair, and replacement of physical capital already in
use, but not for the cost of establishing new companies or products or
of enlarging an existing business. 159 Over the years, a number of schol-
ars have advocated capitalization and amortization of educational ex-
penditures as the proper method of handling these expenses.' 60 This
proposal is consistent with proper accounting theory and with the han-
dling of other capital expenditures. A theoretically defensible system
would operate as follows:
(1) All educational expenditures that bear a direct and proximate
relationship to the taxpayer's trade or business would be capitalized.
(2) The capitalized expenditure would be amortized over a pe-
riod extending from the date of the expenditure (or entry into the busi-
ness, whichever is later) until a specified presumed retirement age, such
as sixty-five.
(3) The annual deduction would be limited by the amount of in-
come from the trade (or new trade which also satisfies the reasonable-
nexus test in step (1)). The outstanding basis would be reduced by the
full amount of the deduction as determined from the original basis and
useful life, even if this amount exceeds the income from the trade.
(4) The cost of education received by the taxpayer as a gift would
be capitalized in the same manner as education paid for by the tax-
157. See I.R.C. §§ 167, 178, 189. The fundamental accounting principle of matching under-
lies this treatment: net income is properly measured by deducting from gross income expenditures
incurred in producing that income. As a capital expenditure assists in producing income in a
number of periods, the cost of the expenditure should be divided among each of the periods
benefited in order to reflect net income correctly.
158. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) (1967).
159. R. GOODE 82-83.
160. See, eg., R. GOODE 83; Halperin, supra note 153, at 903; McNulty 26; Wolfman, supra
note 122, at 547.
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payer. Educational costs not incurred, due to receipt of a scholarship,
would not be capitalized.
(5) A loss would be allowed in the year of the taxpayer's death in
the amount of any remaining unamortized educational expense.
The capitalization scheme proposed above addresses a number of
subsidiary issues, such as what types of educational expenses should be
capitalized, what useful life should be used, and how the capitalized
expenditure should be treated upon the taxpayer's death.
1. The Types of Educational Expenses That ShouldBe Capitalized
andAmortized. The reasonable-nexus test, used by the current regula-
tion to distinguish between business-related and personal educational
expenditures, 161 is also a satisfactory means of identifying educational
costs that should be capitalized. The test would allow capitalization of
professional and vocational educational expenditures, and deny capi-
talization of the cost of elementary and high school education. 162 The
cost of a college undergraduate education, however, presents a more
difficult case. A general liberal arts education would fail the reason-
able-nexus test in most instances, 163 but a degree in a vocational field
such as business, engineering, or nursing is arguably business-related.
Permitting a vocational major to amortize the entire cost of his educa-
tion although the liberal arts major receives no such deduction would
undoubtedly strike many people as inequitable, however, because some
part of the former's education is undoubtedly personal and some part
of the latter's education is probably business-related. This perceived
inequity might lead to congressional intervention granting or denying
amortization for all college expenditures despite the theoretical flaws of
such an approach. A more limited method would allow amortization
only of those costs associated with individual courses, or courses from
particular departments, that satisfy the reasonable-nexus test. This
method would not be simple to administer, 164 but it would be prefera-
161. See note 153 supra and accompanying text.
162. See Kroll v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 557 (1968), which involved the cost of a child actor's
attendance at a private school. That pre-college education is general in nature and available free
of charge also argues against its capitalization. Allowing the capitalization and amortization of
such education would act primarily as a mild incentive to attend private schools. R. GOODE 86.
163. A general education undoubtedly makes any individual better at his profession, but un-
less particular skills related to the taxpayer's business are maintained or improved, the personal
element of the education predominates. Carroll v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 213, 218 (1968), aft'd,
418 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1969). The taxpayer should, of course, be given the opportunity to rebut the
presumption that a liberal arts education is personal. Consider, for example, a foreign language
major who becomes an interpreter or a fine arts major who takes a job restoring artwork.
164. See Halperin, supra note 153, at 904.
1023
DUKE LAW JOURVAL
ble to a blanket grant or denial of amortization of undergraduate edu-
cation.
2. The Period Over Which the Education Should Be Amortized. A
common explanation for the failure to grant capital educational ex-
penditures the same treatment accorded other capital expenditures is
that unlike a factory, building, or machine, the useful life of an educa-
tion is relatively indeterminable. 165 There is merit to this argument,
but the point is weakened by the Code's present allowance of amortiza-
tion of other expenditures whose useful life is indeterminable, such as
the organizational expenditures of a business and research and experi-
mental expenditures. 166 The relevant question is not whether the useful
life of the expenditure can be determined with certainty, but rather
what period of time will best approximate the useful life.
Three methods have been suggested for measuring the useful life
of a capital expenditure in education: the normal retirement age in the
industry in which the taxpayer is employed, 167 the expected lifetime of
the taxpayer,1 68 and a standard assumed retirement age such as sixty-
five. 169 Of the three methods, the selection of a single assumed retire-
ment age provides the best compromise between accuracy and simplic-
ity. The other methods would involve the use of actuarial tables or
computed retirement ages for separate industries with cumbersome cal-
culations by the Service or the taxpayer. A single retirement age of
sixty-five would avoid this burden and, because most individuals will
retire at about that age, still result in a reasonably accurate base.
165. Wolfman, supra note 21, at 1093; Comment, The Deductibility of Educational Expenses:
Administrative Construction of Statute, 17 BUFFALO L. REV. 182, 210 (1967).
166. I.R.C. §§ 174, 248. One recent case rejected an argument for the amortization of the cost
of a bar review course, but allowed amortization of the bar exam fee. Sharon v. Commissioner, 66
T.C. 515, 527-31 (1976), arId, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979).
167. Wolfman, supra note 122, at 547.
168. The taxpayer in Sharon v. Commissioner, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 941 (1979), advocated this method. The method is used to account for fees paid by physi-
cians to acquire hospital privileges. Walters v. Commissioner, 383 F.2d 922, 924 (6th Cir. 1967);
Heigerick v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 475, 478-79 (1966); Howard v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 833,
838-39 (1963).
169. The taxpayer in Denman v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 439, 441 (1967), unsuccessfully urged
this approach. Some have suggested that a shorter time period, such as twenty years, be used for
purposes of simplicity. See R. GOODE 87; McNulty 32. Even shorter periods could be applied if
the education was used in certain favored employments, such as government service. Zinman,
supra note 122, at 25. While an accelerated write-off may have merit as a means of encouraging
people to invest in education or enter certain trades, its use for such purposes is beyond the scope
of this Comment, which focuses on the proper measurement of net income.
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3. The Income Against Which the Expenditure Should Be Amor-
tized. Although the amortization of educational expenses arguably
should be deductible against all taxable income, as are most other busi-
ness expenses,170 most proposals rightly suggest that the deduction only
be allowed to offset earned income or income from the business activity
which the education maintains. 17' Limiting the deduction to income
from activities the education benefits would be consistent with a deter-
mination under the reasonable-nexus test that the education was ob-
tained for business rather than for personal purposes. If the education
appeared to be business-related, but was not actually used in the rela-
vant business, limiting the deduction to income from business activity
benefited by the education would operate to deny the deduction. For
example, although law school ordinarily would be presumed to be busi-
ness-related, a deduction limited to income from the activity the educa-
tion supports would serve objectively to separate those who attend law
school for its value as a liberal arts education from those who enter into
legal practice. 172
A related issue is the question of what amount should be sub-
tracted from the basis in the educational asset when the amount of in-
come from the business against which amortized expenses can be
deducted would limit the deduction to an amount lower than could
otherwise be taken. This situation arises when a taxpayer suspends em-
ployment for a period of time or changes to an unrelated job. The
taxpayer could either be allowed to subtract from the basis only the
amount actually deducted, thereby preserving the rest for deduction at
a later date, or be required to subtract the maximum amount that
would have been deducted had there been sufficient income from the
relevant trade. The latter method, which treats the amount not de-
ducted as "unused" education, the benefit of which is lost forever, is
preferable. The first method provides a somewhat greater benefit to the
taxpayer, and is more accurate in the sense that the education is not
unused, but rather is used at a later time. In the usual case, however,
when the absence from work is short and the career is long enough that
170. McNulty 31.
171. See R. GOODE 86; McNulty 30-31; Zinman, supra note 122, at 25.
172. This approach appropriately resembles the treatment accorded hobby income. Expendi-
tures incurred for both education and alleged hobbies may be made for either personal or business
reasons, or for a combination of the two. In the case of hobbies, the difficulty of determining a
taxpayer's motivation prompted Congress to enact section 183, which allows deductions derived
from an activity to the extent of income from the activity, even if the activity is not engaged in for
profit. The inquiry into the taxpayer's intent is thereby avoided.
An alternative to limiting the education deduction to income from the appropriate business is
to use earned income as the limit. This method provides slightly less protection than the method
used for hobbies, but is simpler to administer.
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the lost deduction is minimal, the simplicity of the second method
countervails. Its superiority becomes even more apparent when the
proper treatment of the basis remaining at the taxpayer's death is con-
sidered.1 73
4. Should Deductions BeAllowed Taxpayers Who Did Not Payfor
the Education They Received? Under current tax laws, an individual
who receives an asset as a gift is entitled to a depreciation deduction
against the basis of the asset as determined after the transfer 74 even
though the asset cost the taxpayer nothing. The question thus arises
whether to allow amortization for education received by the taxpayer
but not paid for by him.175 This situation occurs when the taxpayer's
parents pay for his education, when the taxpayer receives a scholarship,
and when the taxpayer attends a service academy at no cost. Amortiza-
tion is theoretically justifiable when the education is paid for by the
student's family but not when it is paid for by scholarship or when
there is no tuition. Education paid for by the family is like a gift; schol-
arship-paid or cost-free education, however, is more in the nature of a
reduction in the selling price of the asset. The situation is analogous to
one in which the purchaser of a capital asset makes a good buy. His
basis is determined by the price he actually pays, not by the prevailing
market price that he was able to reduce. The student attending school
on a scholarship essentially purchases his education on sale and should
not be allowed to amortize the education using a basis applicable to the
normal purchaser.
5. Treatment of Unamortized Educational Costs Upon the Tax-
payer's Death.'76 When a physical asset used in a business is destroyed
or becomes obsolete before it has been fully depreciated, the asset is
written off and a loss recognized. 177 If education is viewed as a capital
asset, similar treatment is appropriate upon the death of a taxpayer
who has failed to amortize all of his educational costs before dying. 178
The remainder of the unamortized expense could be written off in the
taxpayer's last taxable year, with -appropriate carryback of any result-
173. See text accompanying notes 177-80 infra.
174. See I.R.C. §§ 167, 1014.
175. For a case presenting this problem, but decided on traditional grounds, see Denman v.
Commissioner, 48 T.C. 439 (1967).
176. This discussion assumes that the issue is resolved when the taxpayer dies, rather than
when he retires. Unlike retirement, death forecloses the possibility that the taxpayer will reenter
the labor force at a later date. Cf. R. GOODE 87 (reference to later reentry of married women into
work force).
177. I.R.C. § 165.
178. R. GOODE 87; McNulty 32.
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ing net operating loss. 179
It is important to observe that whether to allow recognition of a
loss at the taxpayer's death in the amount of the basis of unamortized
expense is related to the question whether to subtract from that basis,
throughout the taxpayer's life, amounts not deducted because of lim-
ited income against which amortized expenses could be deducted.180 If
unused deductions were carried forward during the taxpayer's life, in-
dividuals who incurred a particular educational expense for personal
use would probably carry a significant balance of unamortized educa-
tional expense at their deaths. Granting a write-off of the unamortized
expense under these circumstances would allow a business deduction
for a personal expense. To some extent, this would diminish the effec-
tiveness of limiting the deduction to earned income or income from the
activity as a means of separating business from personal educational
expenses in the first place.
Under the preferred system, in which deductions not taken are
subtracted from the basis and lost, the recognition of a casualty loss
upon death would include personal educational expenses to a signifi-
cantly lesser degree. The most equitable approach, then, is to allow the
recognition of a casualty loss of unamortized educational expenses
upon the death of the taxpayer in conjunction with reducing the basis
of the educational cost by the full annual amortizable amount, whether
or not such amount is fully deductible.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite major attempts in 1958 and 1967 to clarify the tax treat-
ment of educational expenses, the area remains one of the most liti-
gated and confused in the Internal Revenue Code. Eliminating the
new-trade-or-business test, the prime contributor to the controversy
surrounding educational expenses, offers a practical solution to the
problems. The test sweeps too broadly in disqualifying otherwise de-
ductible expenditures'" and has been marked by inconsistent applica-
tion.1 8 2 Eliminating the test would go far in providing a more equitable
treatment of the expenses of education.
Although the proposed elimination of the new-trade-or-business
test is a practical solution to the problems associated with the tax treat-
ment of educational expenditures, it is only a partial response. By fail-
179. See I.R.C. § 172.
180. See text accompanying notes 170-73 supra.
181. See notes 93-111, 141 supra and accompanying text.
182. See note 108 supra and text accompanying notes 107-08 supra.
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ing to provide for the amortization of capital educational expenditures,
it still falls short of a proper theoretical treatment. Amortization, advo-
cated by scholars for a number of years, would treat both government
and taxpayer fairly by denying to each the windfalls now available
from improper definition and treatment of capital expenditures.
Adopting a system in which business-related educational costs are capi-
talized and amortized over the useful life of the education would treat
educational expenses in a manner that is theoretically sound and con-
sistent with the tax treatment of other business assets.
David C Tarshes
